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Abstract. In this work we completely characterize how the frequency with which each player par-
ticipates in the game dynamics affects the possibility of reaching efficient states, i.e., states with an
approximation ratio within a constant factor from the price of anarchy, within a polynomially bounded
number of best responses. We focus on the well known class of congestion games and we show that,
if each player is allowed to play at least once and at most β times any T best responses, states with
approximation ratio O(β) times the price of anarchy are reached after T ⌈log log n⌉ best responses, and
that such a bound is essentially tight also after exponentially many ones. One important consequence
of our result is that the fairness among players is a necessary and sufficient condition for guaranteeing
a fast convergence to efficient states. This answers the important question of the maximum order of β
needed to fast obtain efficient states, left open by [9,10] and [3], in which fast convergence for constant
β and very slow convergence for β = O(n) have been shown, respectively. Finally, we show that the
structure of the game implicitly affects its performances. In particular, we show that in the symmetric
setting, in which all players share the same set of strategies, the game always converges to an efficient
state after a polynomial number of best responses, regardless of the frequency each player moves with.
Keywords: Congestion Games, Speed of Convergence, Best Response Dynamics.
1 Introduction
The class of congestion games is a well established approach for modelling any non-cooperative system in
which a set of resources are shared among a set of selfish players. In a congestion game we have a set of
m resources and a set of n players. Each player’s strategy consists of a subset of resources. The delay of a
particular resource e depends on its congestion, corresponding to the number of players choosing e, and the
cost of each player i is the sum of the delays associated with the resources selected by i. In this work we focus
on linear congestion games where the delays are linear functions. A congestion game is called symmetric if
all players share the same strategy set. A state of the game is any combination of strategies for the players
and its social cost, defined as the sum of the players’ costs, denotes its quality from a global perspective.
The social optimum denotes the minimum possible social cost among all the states of the game.
Related work. Rosenthal [13] has shown, by a potential function argument, that the natural decentral-
ized mechanism known as Nash dynamics consisting in a sequence of moves in which at each one some player
switches its strategy to a better alternative, is guaranteed to converge to a pure Nash equilibrium [12].
In order to measure the degradation of social welfare due to the selfish behavior of the players, Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou [11] defined the price of anarchy as the worst-case ratio between the social cost in a Nash
equilibrium and that of a social optimum. The price of anarchy for congestion games has been investigated
by Awerbuch et al. [2] and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [5]. They both proved that the price of anarchy
for congestion games with linear delays is 5/2.
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The existence of a potential function relates the class of congestion games to the class of polynomial local
search problems (PLS) [7]. Fabrikant et al. [8] proved that, even for symmetric congestion games, the problem
of computing Nash equilibria is PLS-complete [7]. One major consequence of the completeness result is the
existence of congestion games with initial states such that any improvement sequence starting from these
states needs an exponential number of steps in the number of players n in order to reach a Nash equilibrium.
A recent result by Ackermann et al. [1] shows that the previous negative result holds even in the restricted
case of congestion games with linear delay functions.
The negative results on computing equilibria in congestion games have lead to the development of the
concept of ǫ-Nash equilibrium, in which no player can decrease its cost by a factor of more than ǫ. Un-
fortunately, as showed by Skopalik and Vo¨cking [14], also the problem of finding an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in
congestion games is PLS-complete for any ǫ, though, under some restrictions on the delay functions, Chien
and Sinclair [4] proved that in symmetric congestion games the convergence to ǫ-Nash equilibrium is poly-
nomial in the description of the game and the minimal number of steps within each player has chance to
move.
Since negative results tend to dominate the issues relative to equilibria, another natural arising question
is whether efficient states (with a social cost comparable to the one of any Nash equilibrium) can be reached
by best response moves in a reasonable amount of time (see [3,6,9,10]). We measure the efficiency of a state
by the ratio among its cost and the optimal one, and we refers to it as the approximation ratio of the state.
We generally say that a state is efficient when its approximation ratio is within a constant factor from the
price of anarchy. Since the price of anarchy of linear congestion games is known to be constant [2,5], efficient
states approximate the social optimum by a constant factor. It is worth noticing that in the worse case, a
generic Nash dynamics starting from an arbitrary state could never reach a state with an approximation
ratio lower than the price of anarchy. Furthermore, by a potential function argument it is easy to show that
in a linear congestion game, once a state S with a social cost C(S) is reached, even if such a state is not a
Nash equilibrium, we are guaranteed that for any subsequent state S′ of the dynamics, C(S′) = O(C(S)).
Awerbuch et al. [3] have proved that for linear congestion games, sequences of moves reducing the cost
of each player by at least a factor of ǫ, converge to efficient states in a number of moves polynomial in
1/ǫ and the number of players, under the minimal liveness condition that every player moves at least once
every a polynomial number of moves. Under the same liveness condition, they also proved that exact best
response dynamics can guarantee the convergence to efficient states only after an exponential number of
best responses [3]. Nevertheless, Fanelli et al. [9] have shown that, under more restrictive condition that each
player plays exactly once every n best responses, any best response dynamics converges to an efficient state
after Θ(n log logn) best responses. Subsequently, Fanelli and Moscardelli [10] extended the previous results
to the more general case in which each player plays a constant number of times every O(n) best responses.
Our Contribution. In this work we completely characterize how the frequency with which each player
participates in the game dynamics affects the possibility of reaching efficient states. In particular, we close
the most important open problem raised by [3] and [9,10] for linear congestion games. On the one hand, in [3]
it is shown that, even after an exponential number of best responses, states with a very high approximation
ratio, namely Ω
( √
n
logn
)
, can be reached. On the other hand, in [9,10] it is shown that, under the minimal
liveness condition in which every player moves at least once every T steps, if players perform best responses
such that each player is allowed to play at most β = O(1) times any T steps (notice that β = O(1) implies
T = O(n)), after T ⌈log logn⌉ best responses a state with a constant factor approximation ratio is reached.
The more β increases, the less the dynamics is fair with respect to the chance every player has of
performing a best response: β measures the degree of unfairness of the dynamics. The important left open
question was that of determining the maximum order of β needed to obtain fast convergence to efficient
states: We answer this question by proving that, after T ⌈log logn⌉ best responses, the dynamics reaches
states with an approximation ratio of O(β). Such a result is essentially tight since we are also able to show
that, for any ǫ > 0, there exist congestion games for which, even for an exponential number of best responses,
states with an approximation ratio of Ω(β1−ǫ) are obtained. Therefore, β constant as assumed in [9,10] is
not only sufficient, but also necessary in order to reach efficient states after a polynomial number of best
responses.
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Finally, in the special case of symmetric congestion games, we show that the unfairness in best response
dynamics does not affect the fast convergence to efficient states; namely, we prove that, for any β, after
T ⌈log logn⌉ best responses efficient states are always reached.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section provide the basic notation and definitions. Section
3 is devoted to the study of asymmetric congestion games, while Section 4 to the analysis of the symmetric
case. Finally, Section 5 extends the results to more general settings and gives some conclusive remarks.
2 Model and Definitions
A congestion game G = (N,E, (Σi)i∈N , (fe)e∈E , (ci)i∈N ) is a non-cooperative strategic game characterized
by the existence of a set E of resources to be shared by n players in N = {1, . . . , n}.
Any strategy si ∈ Σi of player i ∈ N is a subset of resources, i.e., Σi ⊆ 2E . A congestion game is called
symmetric if all players share the same set of strategies, i.e., Σ = Σi for every i ∈ N . Given a state or
strategy profile S = (s1, . . . , sn) and a resource e, the number of players using e in S, called the congestion
on e, is denoted by ne(S) = |{i ∈ N | e ∈ si}|. A delay function fe : N 7→ R+ associates to resource e a delay
depending on the number of players currently using e, so that the cost of player i for the pure strategy si is
given by the sum of the delays associated with the resources in si, i.e., ci(S) =
∑
e∈si fe(ne(S)).
In this paper we will focus on linear congestion games, that is having linear delay functions with nonneg-
ative coefficients. More precisely, for every resource e ∈ E, fe(x) = aex + be for every resource e ∈ E, with
ae, be ≥ 0.
Given the strategy profile S = (s1, . . . , sn), the social cost C(S) of a given state S is defined as the
sum of all the players’ costs, i.e., C(S) =
∑
i∈N ci(S). An optimal strategy profile S
∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s
∗
n) is one
having minimum social cost; we denote C(S∗) by Opt. The approximation ratio of state S is given by the
ratio between the social cost of S and the social optimum, i.e., C(S)Opt . Moreover, given the strategy profile
S = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) and a strategy s
′
i ∈ Σi, let (S−i, s′i) = (s1, s2, . . . , si−1, s′i, si+1, . . . , sn), i.e., the strategy
profile obtained from S if player i changes its strategy from si to s
′
i.
The potential function is defined as Φ(S) =
∑
e∈E
∑ne(S)
j=1 fe(j). It is call exact potential function since
it satisfies the property that for each player i and each strategy s′i ∈ Σi of i in S, it holds that ci(S−i, s′i)−
ci(S) = Φ(S−i, s′i) − Φ(S). It is worth noticing that in linear congestion games, for any state S, it holds
Φ(S) ≤ C(S) ≤ 2Φ(S).
Each player acts selfishly and aims at choosing the strategy decreasing its cost, given the strategy choices
of other players. A best response of player i in S is a strategy sbi ∈ Σi yielding the minimum possible cost,
given the strategy choices of the other players, i.e., ci(S−i, sbi ) ≤ ci(S−i, s′i) for any other strategy s′i ∈ Σi.
Moreover, if no s′i ∈ Σi is such that ci(S−i, s′i) < ci(S), the best response of i in S is si. We call a best
response dynamics any sequence of best responses.
Given a best response dynamics starting from an arbitrary state, we are interested in the social cost of
its final state. To this aim, we must consider dynamics in which each player moves at least once every a
given number T of best responses, otherwise one or more players could be “locked out” for arbitrarily long
and we could not expect to bound the social cost of the state reached at the end of the dynamics. Therefore,
we define a T -covering as a dynamics of T consecutive best responses in which each player moves at least
once. More precisely, a T -covering R =
(
S0R, . . . , S
T
R
)
is composed by T best responses; S0R is said to be the
initial state of R and STR is its final state. For every 1 ≤ t ≤ T , let πR(t) be the player performing the t-th
best response of R; πR is such that every player performs at least a best response in R. In particular, for
every 1 ≤ t ≤ T , StR =
(
(St−1R )−πR(t), s
′
πR(t)
)
and s′
πR(t)
is a best response of player πR(t) in S
t−1
R . For any
i = 1, . . . , n, the last best response performed by player i in R is the lastR(i)-th best response of R, leading
from state SlastR(i)−1 to state SlastR(i). When clear from the context, we will drop the index R from the
notation, writing Si, π and last(i) instead of SiR, πR and lastR(i), respectively.
Definition 1 (T -Minimum Liveness Condition). Given any T ≥ n, a best response dynamics satisfies
the T -Minimum Liveness Condition if it can be decomposed into a sequence of consecutive T -coverings.
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In Section 3.2 we show that (for the general asymmetric case) under such a condition the quality of the
reached state can be very bad even considering T = O(n) (see Corollary 1): It is worth noticing that in the
considered congestion game, only 4
√
n players perform a lot of best responses (
√
n best responses) in each
covering, while the remaining n − 4√n players perform only one best response every T -covering. The idea
here is that there is a sort of unfairness in the dynamics, given by the fact that the players do not have the
same chances of performing best responses.
In order to quantify the impact of fairness on best response dynamics, we need an additional parameter
β and we define the β-bounded T -covering as a T -covering in which every player performs at most β best
responses.
Definition 2 ((T, β)-Fairness Condition). Given any β ≥ 1, a dynamics satisfies the (T, β)-Fairness
Condition if it can be decomposed into a sequence of consecutive β-bounded T -coverings.
Notice that β is a sort of (un)fairness index: If β is constant, it means that every player plays at most a
constant number of times in each T -covering and therefore the dynamics can be considered fair.
In order to prove our upper bound results, we will focus our attention on particular congestion games to
which any linear congestion game is best-response reducible. The following definition formally states such a
notion of reduction.
Definition 3 (Best-Response Reduction). A congestion game G is Best-Response reducible to a conges-
tion game G′ with the same set of players if there exists an injective function g mapping any strategy profile
S of G to a strategy profile g(S) of G′ such that
(i) the social cost of S in G is equal to the one of g(S) in G′ and for any i = 1, . . . , n the cost of player i in
S is equal to the one of player i in G′
(ii) there exists, in the game G, a best response of a player, say i, in S leading to state S′ if and only if there
exists, in the game G′, a best response of player i in g(S) leading to state g(S′).
3 The Impact of Fairness
In this section we first (in Subsection 3.1) provide an upper bound to the approximation ratio of the states
reached after a dynamics satisfying the (T, β)-Minimum Liveness Condition, starting from an arbitrary state
and composed by a number of best responses polynomial in n. Finally (in Subsection 3.2), we provide an
almost matching lower bound holding for dynamics satisfying the same conditions.
3.1 Upper bound
All the results hold for linear congestion games having delay functions fe(x) = aex + be with ae, be ≥ 0 for
every e ∈ E. Since our bounds are given as a function of the number of players, the following proposition
allows us to focus on congestion games with identical delay functions f(x) = x.
Proposition 1. Any linear congestion game is best-response reducible to a congestion game having the same
set of players and identical delay functions f(x) = x.
Proof. Given a congestion game G having delay functions fe(x) = aex+ be with integer coefficient ae, be ≥ 0,
it is possible to reduce it to a congestion game G′, having the same set of players and identical delay functions
f(x) = x in the following way. For each resource e in G, we include in G′ a set Ae of ae resources and n sets
B1e , . . . , B
n
e , each containing be resources; moreover, given any strategy si ∈ Σi in G, i = 1, . . . , n, we build
a corresponding strategy s′i ∈ Σ′i (in G′) by including in s′i, for each e ∈ si, all the resources in the sets Ae
and Bie. The function g is such that any strategy profile (s1, . . . , sn) of G is mapped to the strategy profile
(s′1, . . . , s
′
n) of G′. If ae and be are not integers we can perform a similar reduction by exploiting a simple
scaling argument. ⊓⊔
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Since the dynamics satisfies the (T, β)-Fairness Condition, we can decompose it into k β-bounded T -
coverings R1, . . . , Rk.
Consider a generic β-bounded T -covering R =
(
S0, . . . , ST
)
. In the following we will often consider the
immediate costs (or delays) of players during R, that is the cost cπ(t)(S
t) right after the best response of
player π(t), for t = 1, . . . , T .
Given an optimal strategy profile S∗, since the t-th player π(t) performing a best response, before doing
it, can always select the strategy she would use in S∗, her immediate cost can be suitably upper bounded as∑
e∈s∗
π(t)
(
ne(S
t−1) + 1
)
.
By extending and strengthening the technique of [9,10], we are able to prove that the best response
dynamics satisfying the (T, β)-Fairness Condition fast converges to states approximating the social optimum
by a factor O(β). It is worth noticing that, by exploiting the technique of [9,10], only a much worse bound of
O(β2) could be proved. In order to obtain an O(β) bound, we need to develop a different and more involved
technique, in which also the functions ρ and H , introduced in [9,10], have to be redefined: roughly speaking,
they now must take into account only the last move in R of each player, whereas in [9,10] they was counting
for all the moves in R.
We now introduce functions ρ and H , defined over the set of all the possible β-bounded T -coverings:
– Let ρ(R) =
∑n
i=1
∑
e∈s∗
i
(
ne(S
lastR(i)−1) + 1
)
;
– let H(R) =
∑n
i=1
∑
e∈s∗
i
ne(S
0).
Notice that ρ(R) is an upper bound to the sum over all the players of the cost that she would experience
on her optimal strategy s∗i just before her last move in R, whereas H(R) represents the sum over all the
players of the delay on the moving player’s optimal strategy s∗i in the initial state S
0 of R. Moreover, since
players perform best responses,
∑n
i=1 ci(S
lastR(i)) ≤ ρ(R), i.e. ρ(R) is an upper bound to the sum of the
immediate costs over the last moves of every players.
The upper bound proof is structured as follows. Lemma 1 relates the social cost of the final state ST of a β-
bounded T -coveringR with ρ(R), by showing that C(ST ) ≤ 2ρ(R). By exploiting Lemmata 2 and 3, providing
an upper (resp. lower) bound to H(R) in terms of ρ(R) (resp. ρ(R)), Lemma 4 proves that ρOpt rapidly
decreases between two consecutive β-bounded T -coverings R and R, showing that ρ(R)Opt = O
(√
ρ(R)
Opt
)
. In
the proof of Theorem 1, after deriving a trivial upper bound equal to O(n) for ρ(R1), Lemma 4 is applied
to all the k − 1 couples of consecutive β-bounded T -coverings of the considered dynamics satisfying the
(T, β)-Fairness Condition.
The following lemmata show that the social cost at the end of any β-bounded T -covering R is at most
2ρ(R), and that ρOpt fast decreases between two consecutive β-bounded T -coverings. They can be proved by
adapting some proofs in [9,10] so that they still hold with the new definition of ρ.
Lemma 1. For any β ≥ 1, given a β-bounded T -covering R, C(ST ) ≤ 2ρ(R).
Proof. Since the players perform best responses, inequality (1) below holds. Moreover, since in R each player
performs at least a best response, inequality (2) holds because for each resource e used in the state ST there
must exist, for every integer j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ ne(ST ), a player having, just after her last best response
in R, a delay on e at least i. Therefore, by recalling the definition of ρ(R),
ρ(R) =
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈s∗
i
(
ne(S
last(i)−1) + 1
)
≥
n∑
i=1
ci(S
last(i)) (1)
≥
∑
e∈E
ne(S
T )∑
j=1
j (2)
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≥ 1
2
∑
e∈E
n2e(S
T ) =
1
2
C(ST ).
⊓⊔
Lemma 2. For any β ≥ 1, given a β-bounded T -covering R ending in ST ,
∑
e∈E
ne(S
T )ne(S
∗)
Opt ≤
√
2 ρ(R)Opt .
Proof. By applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we obtain
∑
e∈E
ne(S
T )ne(S
∗) ≤
√∑
e∈E
n2e(S
T )
∑
e∈E
n2e(S
∗).
Moreover, by Lemma 1 we have
∑
e∈E∗ n
2
e(S
T ) = C(ST ) ≤ 2ρ(R); therefore, since∑e∈E∗ n2e(S∗) = Opt,
we obtain ∑
e∈E
ne(S
T )ne(S
∗) ≤
√
2ρ(R)Opt. (3)
Dividing by Opt both sides of the above inequality, the claim follows. ⊓⊔
In Lemma 3 we are able to relate ρ(R) and H(R) by much strengthening the technique exploited in [9,10].
Lemma 3. For any β ≥ 1, given a β-bounded T -covering R,
ρ(R)
Opt
≤ 2H(R)
Opt
+ 4β + 1.
Proof. First of all, notice that if the players performing in R best responses being improvement moves never
select strategies used by some player in S∗, i.e. if the players select only resources e such that ne(S∗) = 0,
than, by recalling the definitions of ρ(R) and H(R), ρ(R) ≤ H(R) + Opt and the clam would easily follow
for any β ≥ 1.
In the following our aim is that of dealing with the generic case in which players moving in R can increase
the congestions on resources e such that ne(S
∗) > 0.
For every resource e ∈ E, we focus on the congestion on such a resource above a “virtual” congestion
frontier ge = 2βne(S
∗).
We assume that at the beginning of covering R each resource e ∈ E has a congestion equal to
δ0,e = max{ne(S0), ge}, and we define δ0,e as the congestion of level 0 on resource e; moreover, ∆0 =∑
e∈E δ0,e · ne(S∗) is an upper bound to H(R). We refer to ∆0 as the total congestion of level 0.
The idea is that the total congestion of level 0 can induce on the resources a congestion (over the frontier
ge) being the total congestion of level 1, such a congestion a total congestion of level 2, and so on. More
formally, for any p ≥ 1 and any e ∈ E, we define δp,e as the congestion of level p on resource e above the
frontier ge; we say that a congestion δp,e of level p on resource e is induced by an amount xp,e of congestion
of level p− 1 if some players (say, players in Np,e) moving on e can cause such a congestion of level p on e
because they are experimenting a delay on the resources of their optimal strategies due to an amount xp,e
of congestion of level p. Notice that, for each move of the players in Np,e, such an amount xp,e of congestion
of level p − 1 can be used only once, i.e. it cannot be used in order to induce a congestion of level p for
other resources in E \ {e}. In other words, xp,e is the overall congestion of level p− 1 on the resources in the
optimal strategies of players in Np,e used in order to induce the congestion δp,e of level p on resource e.
For any p, the total congestion of level p is defined as ∆p =
∑
e∈E δp,e · ne(S∗). Moreover, for any p ≥ 1,
we have that
∑
e∈E xp,e ≤ β∆p−1 because each player can move at most β times in R and therefore the total
congestion of level p− 1 can be used at most β times in order to induce the total congestion of level p.
It is worth noticing that ρ(R) ≤∑∞p=0∆p+Opt, because∑∞p=0 δp,e is an upper bound on the congestion
of resource e during the whole covering R:
ρ(R) =
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈s∗
i
(
ne(S
last(i)−1) + 1
)
6
≤
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈s∗
i
( ∞∑
p=0
δp,e + 1
)
=
∑
e∈E
(
ne(S
∗)
( ∞∑
p=0
δp,e + 1
))
=
∑
e∈E
∞∑
p=0
δp,ene(S
∗) +
∑
e∈E
ne(S
∗) =
∞∑
p=0
∆p +Opt
In the following, we upper bound
∑∞
p=0∆p.
∆p =
∑
e∈E
δp,e · ne(S∗)
≤
∑
e∈E
xp,e
ge
· ne(S∗) (4)
≤
∑
e∈E
xp,e
2βne(S∗)
· ne(S∗)
≤ ∆p−1
2
, (5)
where inequality 4 holds because δp,e is the portion of congestion on resource e above the frontier ge due to
some moving players having on the resources of their optimal strategy a delay equal to xp,e, and inequality
5 holds because each player can move at most β times in R and therefore the total congestion of level p− 1
can be used at most β times in order to induce the total congestion of level p.
We thus obtain that, for any p ≥ 0, ∆p ≤ ∆02p and
∑∞
p=0∆p ≤ 2∆0.
Since ∆0 =
∑
e∈E max{ne(S0), 2βne(S∗)} · ne(S∗) ≤ H(R) + 2βOpt and ρ(R) ≤
∑∞
p=0∆p + Opt ≤
2∆0 +Opt, we finally obtain the claim. ⊓⊔
By combining Lemmata 2 and 3, it is possible to prove the following lemma showing that ρ(R)Opt fast
decreases between two consecutive coverings.
Lemma 4. For any β ≥ 1, given two consecutive β-bounded T -coverings R and R, ρ(R)Opt ≤ 2
√
2 ρ(R)Opt +4β+1.
Proof. Recall that the initial state S0 of walk R coincides with the final state of walk R, and that H(R) =∑T
i=1
∑
e∈s∗
π(i)
(
ne(S
0)
)
. By inverting the summation in the definition of H(R), we obtain that H(R) =∑
e∈E ne(S
0)ne(S
∗). Therefore, by Lemma 2, H(R)Opt ≤
√
2 ρ(R)Opt . Hence, by combining such an inequality with
Lemma 3, the claim follows. ⊓⊔
By applying Lemma 4 to all the couples of consecutive β-bounded T -coverings, we are now able to prove
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For any linear congestion game G, any best response dynamics satisfying the (T, β)-Fairness
Condition converges from any initial state to a state S such that C(S)Opt = O(β) in at most T ⌈log logn⌉ best
responses.
Proof. Given a bast response dynamics satisfying the (T, β)-Fairness Condition, let R1, . . . , Rk be the k
β-bounded T -coverings in which it can be decomposed. By applying Lemma 4 to all the pairs of consecutive
β-bounded T -coverings Rj and Rj+1, for any j = 1, . . . , k − 1 we obtain that for any α > 1
ρ(Rj+1)
Opt
≤ 2
√
2
ρ(Rj)
Opt
+ 4β + 1.
By combining all the above inequalities for j = 1, . . . , k − 1 and by performing some basic algebraic
manipulations, we obtain that ρ(Rk)Opt = O
(
2k−1
√
ρ(R1)
Opt + β
)
. Thus, by Lemma 1, the cost of the final state
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S of walk Rk is
C(S)
Opt
= O
(
2k−1
√
ρ(R1)
Opt
+ β
)
.
By the definition of ρ(R), since
∑
e∈E ne(S
∗) ≤ ∑e∈E n2e(S∗) = Opt, for any possible β-bounded T -
covering R it holds that
ρ(R) =
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈s∗
i
(
ne(S
last(i)−1) + 1
)
≤
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈s∗
i
(n+ 1)
= (n+ 1)
n∑
i=1
|s∗i | ≤ (n+ 1)
∑
e∈E
ne(S
∗) ≤ (n+ 1)Opt.
Therefore, ρ(R1)Opt ≤ n+ 1 and we obtain
C(S)
Opt
= O
(
2k−1
√
n+ β
)
.
It is worth noticing that k = log logn β-bounded T -coverings are sufficient in order to obtain C(S)Opt = O(β).
Since every β-bounded T -covering, by its definition, contains at most T best responses, the claim follows. ⊓⊔
3.2 Lower bound
Theorem 2. For any ǫ > 0, there exist a linear congestion game G and an initial state S0 such that, for any
β = O(n−
1
log2 ǫ ), there exists a best response dynamics starting from S0 and satisfying the (T, β)-Fairness
Condition such that for a number of best responses exponential in n the cost of the reached states is always
Ω(β1−ǫ ·Opt).
Proof. We construct a congestion game G for which there is an initial state S0 and an exponentially long
sequence of best responses starting from this state. In every round, each player moves at most β times. For
technical reasons, we assume β is even and β > 10.
We present the construction in two stages. In a first step we construct a game G′ that has the desired
properties only if we assume players change their strategies even if they have exactly the same delay. In a
second step, extend G′ towards a game G in which those strategy changes are improving best responses.
We define fi = (
β
log β )
1− 1
2i+1 . The players and the resources are divided into L + 1 levels, 0, . . . , L. Each
level i is divided into βi blocks (i, 1), . . . , (i, βi). Each block (i, j) consists of 3fi players,
m
βi
main resources,
and 2fi log β address resources. We group the players into fi triplets and denote them by Pi,j,k, Qi,j,k, and
Ri,j,k with 1 ≤ k ≤ fi. The general idea is the following. In the optimal solution all players of level i only
use the main resources of level i. The resources are evenly distributed among the triplets. However, in the
sequence that we construct, the P player of a block of level i always allocate main resources of a block in
level i+ 1 such that these players cannot choose the main resources of level i+ 1. We say the P players of a
block (i, j) block the players of a block (i+1, j′). In each round, each block blocks β blocks of the next level.
The purpose of the Q and R players and the address resources is to make sure that all P players block the
same block of the next level.
We now describe the strategies and resources in detail. Each player has β + 1 strategies that we denote
by s0(·), . . . , sβ(·). Only the s0 strategies of players of a block (i, j) contain main resources from level i.
Moreover, the main resources of block (i, j) are equally distributed among the triplets. The delay function
of the main resources is f(x) = x.
s0(Pi,j,k) = s0(Qi,j,k) = s0(Ri,j,k) = {pi,j,m(k−1)
βifi
+1
, . . . , pi,j, mk
βifi
}
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The Q and R players use the address resources to binary encode α when playing sα. The Q players are
for the even numbers the R players for the odd numbers. Thus, for every 1 ≤ α ≤ β the Q and R players
have a strategy.
sα(Qi,j,k) = {q0i,j,k,l | for all 1 ≤ l ≤ log(β − 1) with bit l of α is 0} ∪ {q1i,j,k,l | for all 1 ≤ l ≤
log(β − 1) with bit l of α is 1}
sα(Ri,j,k) = {r0i,j,k,l | for all 1 ≤ l ≤ log(β − 1) with bit l of α is 0} ∪ {r1i,j,k,l | for all 1 ≤ l ≤
log(β − 1) with bit l of α is 1}
The delay function for each of the r and q resources is f(x) = mfi
βi+1
x.
The P players allocate main resources of the next level (i+ 1) in their strategies sα. More precisely, the
players of block (i, j) allocate all main resources that are part of the s0 strategy of block (i+1, (j− 1)β+α).
Additionally, the strategy contain the address resources that we used above to binary encode a number.
Note that the use of the address resources is inverted compared to the Q and R players.
For all even α ∈ {2, . . . , β}:
sα(Pi,j,k) = {ti,j,k,α, pi+1,(j−1)β+α,1, . . . , pi+1,(j−1)β+α, m
βi+1
} ∪ {q1i,j,k,l | for all 1 ≤ l ≤ log(β −
1) with bit l of α is 0} ∪ {q0i,j,k,l | for all 1 ≤ l ≤ log(β − 1) with bit l of α is 1}
For all odd α ∈ {1, . . . , β − 1}:
sα(Pi,j,k) = {ti,j,k,α, pi+1,(j−1)β+α,1, . . . , pi+1,(j−1)β+α, m
βi+1
} ∪ {r1i,j,k,l | for all 1 ≤ l ≤ log(β −
1) with bit l of α is 0} ∪ {r0i,j,k,l | for all 1 ≤ l ≤ log(β − 1) with bit l of α is 1}
The resource ti,j,k,α has constant delay of
m(fi−k)
βi+1
if α is odd and delay of m(k−1)
βi+1
otherwise.
Before we describe the sequence of best responses let us observe some useful properties of the construction.
Since there are fi player in every block of level i, we can conclude the following.
Claim. If all fi P players of a block (i, j) play strategy sα for some α, then each resource of block (i+1, (j−
1)β + α) has delay of at least fi.
We now observe that there a useful sequences of strategy changes in which the delay of the moving player
stays the same.
Proposition 2. For an even α, consider a strategy profile in which the players Pi,j,k and Qi,j,k of a group
(i, j) play strategy sα, and the players Ri,j,k play sα+1. If the players Pi,j,k change to sα+1 in an order
increasing in k, then each player has delay of mfi log β
βi+1
before and after his strategy change. Additionally,
when a player moves, his strategies sα′ with α
′ 6∈ {α, α+ 1} have delay of more mfi log β
βi+1
.
Proof. Consider a player Pi,j,k before he moves to sα+1. Then k−1 many P players have already changed to
Sα+1. Thus, the p resources of block (i+1, (j−1)β+α) are used by fi− (k−1) other players and, therefore,
induce total delay of m
βi+1
(fi− k+1). Adding m(k−1)βi+1 for the t resource and (log(β − 1)) mfiβi+1 for the address
resources gives the desired result for the strategy sα.
If he changes to Sα+1, there will be k players on the the p resources of block (i + 1, (j − 1)β + α + 1)
inducing total delay of m
βi+1
k. Again, with the t resource and the address resources that conveniently adds
up to log βmfi
βi+1
.
For the strategies sα′ with α
′ 6∈ {α, α + 1}, first consider the case of α′ being even. Observe that there
is a least one bit in which α′ differs from the even number in {α, α + 1}. Therefore, at least one of the q
resources in strategy sα′ of the P player is also used by the Q player of the same triplet and, thus, induces
delay of 2 mfi
βi+1
. The delay of the address resources adds up to at least mfi log β
βi+1
and taking into account the
delay of the t resource the claim follows. The case of an odd α′ is analogous. ⊓⊔
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Claim. The delay of a blocked strategy s0 is greater than a state in the sequence described in Proposition 2,
i.e., m
βifi
fi−1 >
mfi log β
βi+1
.
We are now ready to describe the sequence of strategy changes. We start in a state S0 in which every
player plays his strategy sβ. The sequence is recursively defined as described by Algorithm 1 which is started
by run(1, 1). Note that every player moves at most β time is this sequence. We call this sequence a run of
G′. In a nutshell: Whenever a block is blocked, the P -players iteratively block the s0 strategies of certain β
blocks of the next level. The Q and R players make sure, that the P players block the s0 strategies of the
same block, i.e, all P players change to their strategy sα for some α.
Algorithm 1 Recursive procedure run(i, j)
1: for α = 1 to β do
2: if α is even then
3: for all 1 ≤ k ≤ fi do
4: Qi,j,k changes to sα(Qi,j,k)
5: end for
6: for k = 1 to fi do
7: Pi,j,k changes to sα(Pi,j,k)
8: end for
9: else
10: for all 1 ≤ k ≤ fi do
11: Ri,j,k changes to sα(Ri,j,k)
12: end for
13: for k = fi to 1 do
14: Pi,j,k changes to sα(Pi,j,k)
15: end for
16: end if
17: run(i+ 1, (j − 1)β + α)
18: end for
In the optimal solution, all players play their s0 strategy which yields social cost of 3m(L + 1). During
our sequence the cost of level L is mfL−1 = (
β
log β )
1− 1
2L . Therefore, given any ǫ > 0, it suffices to consider an
ǫ′ < ǫ and to choose L = − log ǫ′ so that the approximation ratio of all the states of the considered dynamics
is always at least β
1−ǫ′
3(1−log ǫ′) log1−ǫ′ β = Ω(β
1−ǫ).
Note that the in the above sequence, the delay of a player that changes his strategy does not change.
In order to complete the proof, we now turn the game into one in which these strategy changes are best
responses. Let us give an overview of the modifications first. We combine above game G′ with a game Gn that
has the property that there is an initial state and every sequence of best responses starting from that state
is exponentially long. We essentially use the game that was presented in [14] and modify its delay functions
to make them linear. The best response sequence of Gn resembles the recursive run of n programs in which
program i is executed 2n−i times. We use the constants M > 20δn and δ ≫ |N |(β + 1) as scaling factors,
where N denotes the set of players of G′. Note that they are independent of m which allows us to arbitrarily
scale the cost of G′.
To each strategy of G′, we add a unique trigger resource with the delay function f(x) = x. Note that
this does not change the preferences of the players. We extend the game with additional trigger players.
Whenever a player of G′ is supposed to change to a strategy s, we make sure that the trigger resources in
all his other strategies are used by trigger players. Therefore, his strategy change decreases his delay by 1.
Let r denote the number of strategy changes of a run of G′, We extend the game with r trigger players
for each strategy of each player of G′. Each trigger player has two strategies, trigger and wait. If he plays
trigger, he allocates the trigger resource. His wait strategy is contains a resource that is also contained in
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the strategies of a player of game Gn. We have one reset player for each trigger player. He has a strategy
wait which is also connected to a player of game Gn and a strategy reset. If he plays reset, the corresponding
trigger player has an incentive to change back to wait.
We are now ready to describe G in detail. For each i ∈ N and 0 ≤ α ≤ β, we add a resource vi,α to
strategy sα(i). It has the delay function f(x) = x. For each i ∈ N and 0 ≤ α ≤ β, we add a player Ti,α. His
strategies are described in Figure 1. We add n players Maini as described in Figure 4 and 8n players Block
j
i
as described in Figure 3. Note that resources of the wait strategies of the trigger and reset players are part
of strategy (9) of player Main1.
We now describe the best response sequence of G. Algorithm 2 describes a recursive run of the players of
G′, the trigger players, and reset players. Note that in such a run, every player moves at most β times. We
now combine such runs with the best response dynamics of Gn. Note that the best response sequence of Gn
is essentially unique as described in [14]. We divide this exponentially long sequence into rounds. We define
the beginning of a round as the state before player Main1 moves from strategy (8) to (9). This divides the
best response sequence into exponentially many rounds in which every player of Gn moves at most 9 times.
At the beginning of a round, we interrupt this sequences and let the remaining players move. We first let all
trigger and reset players play their best response. This ensures that they change to wait. We then let Main1
move from strategy (8) to (9). We then start one run as described in Algorithm 2. Finally, we let the players
of Gn play their best response in decreasing order of their indices with player Block
8
i as the last player. He
is also the only one that changes his strategy. With his move, we continue the best response sequence of Gn
for the remainder of the round.
This yields a exponentially long sequence of best responses that satisfies the (T, β)-Fairness Condition.
Strategies of Ti,α,d Resources Delay function f(x)
trigger vi,α x
ui,α,d 2x
wait wi,α,d 2x
Fig. 1. Definition of the strategies of the trigger player Ti,α,d
Strategies of Ui,α,d Resources Delay function f(x)
reset u 3
ui,α,d 2x
wait xi,α,d 4x
Fig. 2. Definition of the strategies of the reset player Ui,α,d
Strategies of Blockji Resources Delay function f(x)
(1) tji x
b
j
i Mx
(2) c1i Mx
Fig. 3. Definition of the strategies of the players Blockji
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Algorithm 2 Recursive procedure run2(i, j)
1: for α = 1 to β do
2: if α is even then
3: for all 1 ≤ k ≤ fi do
4: for all α′ 6= α do
5: T(Qi,j,k),α′,d change to trigger
6: end for
7: Qi,j,k changes to sα(Qi,j,k)
8: for all α′ 6= α do
9: U(Qi,j,k),α′,d change to reset
10: T(Qi,j,k),α′,d change to wait
11: end for
12: d = d+ 1
13: end for
14: for k = 1 to fi do
15: for all α′ 6= α do
16: T(Pi,j,k),α′,d change to trigger
17: end for
18: Pi,j,k changes to sα(Pi,j,k)
19: for all α′ 6= α do
20: U(Pi,j,k),α′,d change to reset
21: T(Pi,j,k),α′,d change to wait
22: end for
23: d = d+ 1
24: end for
25: else
26: for all 1 ≤ k ≤ fi do
27: for all α′ 6= α do
28: T(Ri,j,k),α′,d change to trigger
29: end for
30: Ri,j,k changes to sα(Ri,j,k)
31: d = d+ 1
32: for all α′ 6= α do
33: U(Ri,j,k),α′,d change to reset
34: T(Ri,j,k),α′,d change to wait
35: end for
36: end for
37: for k = fi to 1 do
38: for all α′ 6= α do
39: T(Pi,j,k),α′,d change to trigger
40: end for
41: Pi,j,k changes to sα(Pi,j,k)
42: d = d+ 1
43: for all α′ 6= α do
44: U(Pi,j,k),α′,d change to reset
45: T(Pi,j,k),α′,d change to wait
46: end for
47: end for
48: end if
49: run(i+ 1, (j − 1)β + α)
50: end for
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Strategy Resources Delay function f(x)
(1) e1i 10δ
ix
e0i 10M
(2) e2i 2M + 19δ
i
c1i−1, . . . , c
8
i−1 Mx
t1i x
(3) e3i 9M + 18δ
i
e1i−1 10δ
i−1x
t2i x
b1i Mx
(4) e4i 8M + 17δ
i
b8i−1 Mx
t3i x
b2i Mx
(5) e5i 9M + 16δ
i
t4i x
b3i Mx
(6) e6i M + 15δ
i
c1i−1, . . . , c
8
i−1 Mx
t5i x
b4i Mx
(7) e7i 9M + 14δ
i
e1i−1 10δ
i−1
t6i x
b5i M
(8) e8i 8M + 13δ
i
b8i−1 Mx
t7i x
b6i Mx
(9) e9 9M + 12δi
t8i x
b7i Mx
Fig. 4. Definition of the strategies of the players Maini. The delay of resource e
1
n is constantly 9δ
n. Strategy (9) of
player Main1 additionally contains resources wi,α,d and xi,α,d for all i ∈ N and 0 ≤ α ≤ β and 1 ≤ d ≤ r.
⊓⊔
By choosing β =
√
n and considering a simplified version of the proof giving the above lower bound,
it is possible to prove the following corollary. In particular, it shows that even in the case of best response
dynamics verifying an O(n)-Minimum Liveness Condition, the speed of convergence to efficient states is very
slow; such a fact implies that the T -Minimum Liveness condition cannot precisely characterize the speed of
convergence to efficient states because it does not capture the notion of fairness in best response dynamics.
Corollary 1. There exist a linear congestion game G, an initial state S0 and a best response dynamics start-
ing from S0 and satisfying the O(n)-Minimum Liveness Condition such that for a number of best responses
exponential in n the cost of the reached states is always Ω
(
4
√
n
logn ·Opt
)
.
Proof. The linear congestion game proving the corollary can be easily obtained by simplifying the construc-
tion exploited in the proof of Theorem 2 such that β =
√
n and the number of levels is 2 (i.e., L = 1). In
such a way, Θ(
4
√
n
logn ) players belong to level 0 and the remaining players to level 1.
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In the optimal solution, all players play their s0 strategy which yields social cost of 6m. During our
sequence the cost of level 1 is mf0 =
(
β
log β
) 1
2
= Ω
(
4
√
n
logn
)
.
⊓⊔
4 Symmetric Congestion Games
In this Section we show that in the symmetric case the unfairness in best response dynamics does not
affect the speed of convergence to efficient states. In particular, we are able to show that, for any β, after
T ⌈log logn⌉ best responses an efficient state is always reached. To this aim, in the following we consider best
response dynamics satisfying only the T -Minimum Liveness Condition, i.e. decomposable into k T -coverings
R1, . . . , Rk.
All the results hold for linear congestion games having delay functions fe(x) = aex + be with ae, be ≥ 0
for every e ∈ E. Analogously to the asymmetric case, since our bounds are given as a function of the number
of players, the following proposition allows us to focus on congestion games with identical delay functions
f(x) = x.
Proposition 3. Any symmetric linear congestion game is best-response reducible to a symmetric congestion
game having the same set of players and identical delay functions f(x) = x.
Proof. Given a symmetric congestion game G having delay functions fe(x) = aex+be with integer coefficient
ae, be ≥ 0, it is possible to perform a best-response reduction to a symmetric congestion game G′, having the
same set of players and identical delay functions f(x) = x in the following way. For each resource e in G, we
include in G′ a set Ae of ae resources and n sets B1e , . . . , Bne , each containing be resources; moreover, given
any strategy set si ∈ Σi in G, i = 1, . . . , n, we build n corresponding strategies s′i,1, s′i,2, . . . , s′i,n ∈ Σ′i (in G′)
by including in s′i,j , for each e ∈ si, all the resources in the sets Ae and Bje . If ae and be are not integers we
can perform a similar reduction by exploiting a simple scaling argument.
The function g is such that any strategy profile S = (s1, . . . , sn) of G is mapped to the strategy profile
S′ = (s′1,1, s
′
2,2 . . . , s
′
n,n) of G′. In such a way, we make sure that, if player j is using resource e in S, in S′
only player j is using the strategy associated with the set Bje . In fact, the reduction guarantees that at every
best response of the dynamics, for each resource e, at most one player uses the set of resources Bke , for every
k.
If ae and be are not integers we can perform a similar reduction by exploiting a simple scaling argument.
⊓⊔
Consider a generic T -covering R =
(
S0, . . . , ST
)
. Given an optimal strategy profile S∗, since the
t-th player π(t) performing a best response, before doing it, can always select any strategy s∗i , for
i = 1 . . . n, of S∗, her immediate cost cπ(t)(S
t) can be upper bounded as 1
n
∑n
i=1
∑
e∈s∗
i
fe(ne(S
t−1) + 1) =
1
n
∑
e∈E ne(S
∗)fe(ne(St−1) + 1). In order to prove our upper bound result, we introduce the following func-
tion:
– Γ (R) = 1
n
∑n
i=1
∑
e∈E ne(S
∗)fe(ne(Slast(i)−1) + 1).
Notice that Γ (R) is an upper bound to the sum of the immediate cost over the last moves of every players,
i.e., Γ (R) ≥∑ni=1 ci(SlastR(i)). Therefore, by exploiting the same arguments used in the proof of Lemma 1,
it is possible to prove the following lemma relating the social cost C(ST ) at the end of R with Γ (R).
Lemma 5. Given any T -covering R, C(ST ) ≤ 2Γ (R).
Moreover, given any T -covering R, we can relate the social cost C(ST ) of the final state of R with the
cost C(S0) of its initial state.
Lemma 6. Given any T -covering R, C(S
T )
Opt ≤ (2 + 2
√
2)
√
C(S0)
Opt .
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Proof.
C(ST )
Opt
≤ 2Γ (R)
Opt
(6)
=
2
nOpt
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈E
ne(S
∗)(ne(S
last(i)−1) + 1)
=
2
nOpt
(
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈E
ne(S
∗)ne(S
last(i)−1) +
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈E
ne(S
∗)
)
≤ 2 + 2
nOpt
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈E
ne(S
∗)ne(S
last(i)−1)
≤ 2 + 2
nOpt
n∑
i=1
√∑
e∈E
n2e(S
∗)
√∑
e∈E
n2e(S
last(i)−1) (7)
= 2 +
2
nOpt
n∑
i=1
√
Opt
√
C(Slast(i)−1)
≤ 2 + 2
n
√
Opt
n∑
i=1
√
2Φ(Slast(i)−1) (8)
≤ 2 + 2
n
√
Opt
n∑
i=1
√
2Φ(S0) (9)
≤ 2 + 2
√
2
√
C(S0)
Opt
(10)
≤ (2 + 2
√
2)
√
C(S0)
Opt
,
where inequality (6) follows from Lemma 5, inequality (7) is due to the application of the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, inequality (8) holds because C(Slast(i)−1) ≤ 2Φ(Slast(i)−1), inequality (9) holds because the poten-
tial function can only decrease at each best response and inequality (10) holds because Φ(S0) ≤ C(S0). ⊓⊔
By applying Lemma 6 to all the couples of consecutive T -coverings, we are now able to prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. Given a linear symmetric congestion game, any best response dynamics satisfying the T -
Minimum Liveness Condition converges from any initial state to a state S such that C(S)Opt = O(1) in at
most T ⌈ln lnn⌉ best responses.
Proof. We decompose the dynamics into k consecutive T -coverings R1, . . . , Rk. Recall that, for any j =
1, . . . , k, S0j and S
T
j are the initial and the final state of covering Rj , respectively. Notice that for any
j = 1, . . . , k − 1, STj = S0j+1 and S = STk .
By applying Lemma 6 k − 1 times, we obtain
C(STk )
Opt
≤ (2 + 2
√
2)2
(
C(S01)
Opt
) 1
2k−1
.
Since, at it is easy to check,
C(S01)
Opt ≤ n, the claim follows by choosing k = ⌈ln lnn⌉. ⊓⊔
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5 Conclusion and Extensions
In this work we have completely characterized how, in linear congestion games, the frequency with which each
player participates in the game dynamics affects the possibility of reaching states with an approximation
ratio within a constant factor from the price of anarchy, within a polynomially bounded number of best
responses. We have shown that, while in the asymmetric setting the fairness among players is a necessary
and sufficient condition for guaranteeing a fast convergence to efficient states, in the symmetric one the
game always converges to an efficient state after a polynomial number of best responses, regardless of the
frequency each player moves with.
It is worth to note that our techniques provide a much faster convergence to efficient states with respect
to the previous result in the literature. In particular, in the symmetric setting, Theorem 3 shows that best
response dynamics leads to efficient states much faster than how ǫ-Nash dynamics (i.e., sequences of moves
reducing the cost of a player by at least a factor of ǫ) leads to ǫ-Nash equilibria [4]. Furthermore, also in
the more general asymmetric setting, Theorem 1 shows that the same holds for fair best response dynamics
with respect to ǫ-Nash ones [3].
Although we have focused on linear congestion games, all the results can be extended to the more general
case of congestion games with polynomial delays by exploiting techniques similar to the ones used in [9,10].
In particular, it is possible to show that, if each player is allowed to play at least once and at most β times
any T best responses, states with approximation ratio O(β) times the price of anarchy are reached after
T ⌈log logn⌉ best responses, that such a bound is essentially tight also after exponentially many ones and
that, in the symmetric setting, the game always converges, after T ⌈log logn⌉ best responses and for any
value of β, to states with approximation ratio order of the price of anarchy.
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